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Mr. Chairman, ranking member Green, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate
the opportunity to testify today on the mistaken belief that environmental protection kills jobs.
No matter how many times this fatally flawed argument is repeated, empirical evidence
supporting this assertion is scant and not credible. Instead, the evidence shows that
environmental regulations save lives, preserve irretrievable natural resources, and—not
incidentally—create jobs.
In fact, if we pull the camera back and look at the economy as a whole, we must conclude
that the primary cause of the economic recession causing so much suffering in this country is
under-regulation, not over-regulation. Everything—from the TARP bailouts to the ―underwater‖
mortgage crisis that has pushed so many out of their homes—can be traced back to excessive
corporate corner-cutting unchecked by an effective regulatory system.
I am a law professor at the University of Maryland School of Law and the President of
the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) (http://www.progressivereform.org/). Founded in
2002, CPR is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit research and educational organization comprising a network
of sixty scholars across the nation who are dedicated to protecting health, safety, and the
environment through analysis and commentary. I joined academia mid-career, after working for
the Federal Trade Commission for seven years and this committee for five years, and serving as
outside counsel for a wide variety of small and mid-sized businesses for seven years. My work
on environmental regulation includes four books, and over twenty-seven articles (as author or coauthor). My most recent book, published by the University of Chicago Press, is The People's
Agents and the Battle to Protect the American Public: Special Interests, Government, and
Threats to Health, Safety, and the Environment, which I co-authored with Professor Sidney
Shapiro of Wake Forest University’s School of Law, analyzes the state of the regulatory system
that protects public health, worker and consumer safety, and natural resources, concluding that
these agencies are under-funded, lack adequate legal authority, and are undermined by political
pressure motivated by special interests. I have served as consultant to EPA and have testified
previously before Congress on regulatory subjects on numerous occasions.
My testimony today makes four points:
1. Environmental regulations have saved millions of lives, preventing chronic
respiratory illness and heart attacks in cities across the country. These rules protect
children from irreversible neurological damage, save billions of dollars in cleanup
costs, and preserve water quality in lakes, rivers, and streams.
2. If anything, our regulatory system is dangerously weak, and Congress should focus
on reviving it rather than eroding public protections.
3. Fanciful studies, including and especially the analysis prepared for the Small
Business Administration (SBA) by Nicole and Mark Crain, are the shaky foundation
for the false claims that excessive regulation is at the root of the nation’s problems.
These claims are fomented by large companies seeking to escape regulation, with
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small businesses shoved to the front of the crusade in an effort to put a friendlier face
on this self-serving agenda.
4. The American people have always supported environmental protection with great
enthusiasm and the results of the mid-term elections did not confer a popular mandate
for these kinds of attacks.
Saving Life and Natural Resources
EPA regulations save lives, avoid injuries, and preserve finite natural resources, all goals
that are important to the society for ethical, social, practical, and economic reasons. These
protections reduce health care costs, keep families intact and productive, let workers stay on the
job, and preserve resources for future generations. Not incidentally, taking the remedial steps
that they require, especially when capital investments are involved, creates jobs. Pollution
control equipment must be designed, manufactured, and installed. People must be hired to
construct and operate highly engineered landfills that can safely contain hazardous waste and
treat sewage and drinking water. Even if we restrict the analysis of regulatory impacts to
monetary investments, and do not consider the ethics of preserving life, health, and nature, the
money that is not spent treating cancers, asthma, broken limbs, or neurological disease can be
used in other, more productive ways. It is very difficult to project all these alternatives out in a
mathematically accurate way, especially with respect to regulations across the economy. But
ignoring them does not make them disappear.
Two relevant and closely related examples make this case.
Regulations implementing the Clean Air Act saved 164,300 adult lives in 2010, and will
save 237,000 lives by 2020. EPA estimates that the economic value of Clean Air Act regulatory
controls will be $2 trillion annually by 2020; costs of compliance in that year will be $65 billion.
Air pollution controls saved 13 million days of work loss and 3.2 million days of school loss in
2010. By 2020, they will save 17 million work loss days and 5.4 million school loss days.
EPA’s estimates are based on extraordinarily conservative assumptions regarding
regulatory benefits that, if anything, low-ball these figures. For example, EPA says that when
Clean Air Act protections prevent a non-fatal heart attack in a person 0-24 years old, the incident
is worth only $84,000 and an avoided emergency room visit to treat an asthma attack is worth
only $363 per incident—hospitals don’t give you a plastic ID bracelet for that little! The reason
we are able to develop reliable cost and benefit estimates for the Clean Air Act, of course, is that
EPA has spent 40 years developing an effective system. Before a rule goes into effect, it is much
harder to predict how much its requirements will cost, and any such estimates—typically based
on information provided by potentially regulated industries—overstate costs significantly.
Another ramification of Clean Air Act protections is that, as we have gotten better at
preventing pollutants from going up and out of the stack, we have created other equally pressing
problems because these pollutants do not vaporize, but rather fall out of the scrubbers into fly
and bottom ash. And, in turn, that ash is land-disposed. One place where this phenomenon has
developed into an acute environmental problem is with the disposal of coal ash by electric
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utilities. The highly toxic heavy metals present in coal include antimony, arsenic, barium,
beryllium, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, nickel, selenium, silver, and thallium; burning
coal concentrates these contaminants to dangerous levels.
Utilities generate some 145 million tons of coal ash annually, more than three times the
amount of hazardous chemical waste produced by the manufacturing sector. About half of this
ash is dumped in so-called ―surface impoundments,‖ a euphemism for unlined pits in the ground,
many of which are located adjacent to the bodies of water that power plants depend upon to cool
giant turbines and other equipment. Some 31 percent of landfills and 62 percent of surface
impoundments devoted to coal ash disposal lack liners to contain leaching of hazardous
constituents into underground aquifers, while 10 percent of such landfills and 58 percent of such
impoundments did not have any system for monitoring leaks. About one-third of these
impoundments were constructed without consulting with a professional engineer and, as they
grew in size to accommodate growing volumes of waste, they ended up depending on a juryrigged system of retaining walls and dams, making each one of them a disaster waiting to
happen.
In the early morning hours of December 22, 2008, an earthen dam holding back a 40-acre
surface impoundment at a Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) power plant burst, releasing one
billion gallons of inky coal ash sludge across Kingston, Tennessee. The flood of sludge crossed
a river, destroying twenty-six houses, and infiltrated several streams that bisected the area, lifting
one house off its foundation and moving it forty yards downhill and covering 300 acres in four to
five feet of sludge and mud. Miraculously, no one was killed.
In the aftermath of this catastrophe, which in sheer volume exceeded the Gulf oil spill
that transfixed the nation this past summer, EPA began a rulemaking to compel the safe disposal
of any such coal ash that is not ―beneficially reused,‖ another euphemism that in this case
embraces some reuses that are by no means proven to be beneficial—spreading coal ash on fields
without testing it first for toxicity, for example. Despite EPA’s decision not to even think about
regulating how coal ash is reused, leaving it up to utilities to sell their ash to any taker, electric
utilities—the vast majority of which are very large businesses—have made this minimal rule a
top priority target in the myopic crusade against regulation that has monopolized the House in
recent weeks. If President Obama succumbs to this pressure or Congress intervenes, regulatory
benefits of $102 billion over the next several decades could be lost.
Regulatory Dysfunction
A series of catastrophic regulatory failures have focused attention on the indisputably
troubling condition of crucial regulatory agencies assigned to protect public health, worker and
consumer safety, and the environment. The destructive convergence of funding shortfalls,
political attacks, and outmoded legal authority have set the stage for ineffective enforcement and
unsupervised industry self-regulation. From the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico
that killed eleven and caused grave environmental and economic damage, to the worst mining
disaster in 40 years at the Big Branch mine in West Virginia with a death toll of 29, the signs of
regulatory dysfunction abound. Peanut paste tainted by salmonella, glasses imprinted with the
Shrek logo contaminated by cadmium and sold at McDonald’s, Code Red smog days when
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parents are warned to keep their children indoors, the Vioxx recall—at the bottom of each wellpublicized event is an agency unable to do its job and a company that could not be relied upon to
put the public interest first.
British Petroleum (BP) is the infamous example of the decade, although concluding that
it is rogue, or unique, would be wishful thinking. In the half decade before the Gulf spill, its
executives presided over multiple, extraordinarily serious, and undoubtedly chronic violations of
American health and safety laws throughout its North American operations. If regulators had
sufficient funding and the unequivocal mandate to be sure that worker and environmental safety
were top priorities, not simply nuisance items to be dealt with on the path to massive profits,
these tragedies could have been avoided, sparing the Gulf region and the people who live there
all the damage the spill has caused.
An accident involving superheated water killed two workers at BP’s Texas City refinery
on September 2, 2004, triggering soul-searching at the plant but indifference at corporate
headquarters. Six month later, a massive explosion at the Texas City plant killed fifteen people
on March 25, 2005, in part because of a decision not to make a $150,000 investment to upgrade
equipment that was state-of-the-art in the 1950s and that government inspectors had instructed
the company to change out. Later that summer, BP’s $1 billion Thunder Horse facility in the
Gulf of Mexico collapsed, on July 11, 2005, when a valve designed to prevent the huge platform
from flooding in severe weather failed because it was installed backwards. The platform was
righted and now produces oil, although it is plagued by construction problems, including a
welding job so shoddy that it left underwater pipelines brittle and full of cracks. The following
year, a BP pipeline operating in Prudhoe Bay ruptured on March 2, 2006, releasing 267,000
gallons of oil, the largest spill ever on Alaska’s North Slope. The spill occurred two years after a
whistleblower warned an EPA attorney that the company was systematically neglecting pipeline
maintenance and falsifying inspection reports.
Regulators were not exactly sitting silent during these events, but the penalties they
meted out to BP for health, safety, and environmental violations were little more than a nuisance
to the company, akin to tossing a marble at the side of a battleship as it steams out of port. BP
subsidiaries—as opposed to executives--were convicted of environmental crimes three times in
Alaska and Texas. Two of the cases involved felony charges brought by EPA for harm to the
environment and public health, one under the Clean Air Act and the second under the Clean
Water Act, with the company directed to pay $20 million in fines. Separately, OSHA assessed a
penalty of $109,500 for the September 2, 2004 incident that killed two workers. Not
surprisingly, given the puny nature of this kind of fine, BP’s violations of OSHA requirements
became chronic; the company received 862 OSHA citations between June 2007 and February
2010 for violations at the Texas City plant.
Under new leadership following the election of President Obama, OSHA fined BP $50.6
million following the Texas City explosion. Even this amount paled in comparison to the $1
billion in estimated damages that BP paid in settlement to tort plaintiffs in the aftermath of the
accident. But to put these penalties for life-threatening and ecologically ruinous behavior in
perspective, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission settled a case against the company for
manipulating prices in the propane market, collecting $303 million in civil penalties. BP’s total
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2005 profits were $19.31 billion and $17.29 billion in 2007. So with respect to those who argue
that this is a battle about preserving jobs, I’d suggest that BP is evidence that this isn’t really a
fight about jobs. If anything, it’s a fight about profit. BP had ample funds to hire all the safety
workers it wanted, and yet BP cut corners to minimize costs and make money.
Not every industrial accident can be prevented. But BP has been serial violator. And yet
the inspection resources and enforcement mechanisms available to the regulatory agencies
simply aren’t up to the task. Nor was it clear that the agencies were all that interested in
inspections and enforcement during the Bush Administration. So it seems to me that the real
question for Congress is how to revive the agencies assigned to protect the American people and
how to give them the resources they need to conduct vigorous inspections and enforcement
actions. The question should not be how to demoralize their staffs, cut their budget, and
suppress badly needed new rules.
Fanciful Costs
Although those who assert that a burdensome regulatory system is killing jobs never
really explain exactly why they think that to be case, I must surmise that the theory behind the
claim is that businesses must spend so much to comply with regulations that they run out of
capital to invest in job creation. A recent study on regulatory costs, authored by Nicole and
Mark Crain for the SBA Office of Advocacy claims that regulation costs the U.S. economy $1.75
trillion in 2008. The Crains’ $1.75 trillion estimate is far larger than the cost estimate generated
by the Office of Management and Budget that same year: $62 billion to $73 billion. They
attribute this massive difference to the fact that their report considers many more rules than do
the annual OMB reports, but they refuse to make available a list of the rules they did count and it
is difficult to imagine that this orders-of-magnitude difference is attributable solely to their
attentiveness to minor rules that OMB somehow missed.
I have attached a copy of a Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) report, Setting the
Record Straight: The Crain and Crain Report on Regulatory Costs, as an appendix to my
testimony. This analysis shows that Crain and Crain’s calculations for the regulations not
covered by OMB’s report appear to be based largely on a decidedly unusual data source for
economists – public opinion polling, the results of which the Crains massage into a massive, but
unsupported estimate of the costs of ―economic‖ regulations. Again, because they have refused
to make their underlying data or calculations public, apparently even withholding them from the
SBA office that contracted for the study, it is difficult to know precisely how they arrived at this
result. Nevertheless, their calculations inspire great skepticism.
For one thing, as stated, their estimate of economic regulatory costs is based on the
results of public opinion polling, specifically a poll concerning the business climate of countries
that has been collected in a World Bank report. The authors of the World Bank report warn that
its results should not be used for exactly the type of extrapolations made by Crain and Crain,
because their underlying data are too crude.
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Professor Sidney Shapiro, my co-author and the vice-president of CPR, has written a
letter to SBA urging the agency to withdraw the report before it causes further embarrassment.
He has not yet received a reply.
Public Opinion and the Midterm “Mandate”
The emerging crusade against regulations seems to assume that the public will not miss
the protections provided by regulation. It also seems based on the premise that the public thinks
that all regulations are equally distasteful. From these presumptions, deregulators appear to
argue the results of mid-term elections are a public mandate to de-fund and further weaken the
regulatory system. Certainly that would be the impact of the FY 2011 budget proposal from the
majority this week. If agencies like EPA are weakened further, hoping for a cessation in
catastrophic environmental disasters, much less chronic pollution, is naïve to the point of being
quixotic.
The presumption that the public thinks environmental regulation is distasteful is directly
refuted by public opinion polls. In a September 2010 Pew poll taken shortly before the midterm
election, 81 percent of respondents said they favor stronger environmental regulation. A June
2010 Pew poll recorded 56 percent of respondents as favoring environmental protection over
keeping energy prices low, a lower number but still a clear majority. Even in these dire
economic times, with so many worrying about the cost of living, the deficit, and the availability
of jobs, environmental pollution made the ―top twelve‖ list of major issues in a December 15,
2010 Pew poll. The plurality of respondents—45 percent—concluded that the nation is staying
about the same on the problem, 26 percent thought it is making progress, and 24 percent said it is
losing ground.
I appreciate that the majority feels it has a mandate as a result of the election. But I
would urge all Members to consider whether gutting environmental protection is really what
voters had in mind, or whether this attack on regulation is simply an effort to re-fight past battles
over the nation’s environmental laws, this time by objecting not to the laws themselves but to
their enforcement. It’s bad enough that the agencies are underfunded to the point that they are
barely able to do their jobs. But this fight is really about hobbling such legislative landmarks as
the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and outside the realm of the environment, the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, banking reform, health care, and more.
The corporate and political voices in favor of deregulating today are, by and large, the
same ones that opposed those laws from the outset. But Congress has already made the policy
choices here, directing EPA, for example, to protect the water we drink and the air we breathe,
and to make sure we are not bombarded by a variety of poisons in the food chain that ends in our
lunch boxes and on our dinner tables. Those laws are already on the books, the product of
lengthy consideration by Congress, following ample debate that included all voices. Many of
those laws have been tested in court, too. For good reason, Congress delegated a measure of
authority to the regulatory agencies to establish specific standards, the kind that require scientific
expertise that Members could not reasonably be expected to possess. But Congress made clear
in the law that the agencies must exercise that delegated authority within the specific parameters
established by Congress.
7

I’d point out further that many of the regulations that are drawing fire have not yet been
adopted. Industry is making the same arguments to Congress that it is making to the regulatory
agencies themselves. That process is going forward, the agencies are pursuing the statutory
obligations to craft regulations within the parameters Congress established, and industry and its
allies are exercising their right to flood the agencies with information and objections that will
shape those regulations. In other words, the arguments we’re hearing from industry aren’t
unique. We heard many of them when the bills were passed and we heard them during agency
consideration of the regulations. In some cases, we heard them in court. And now we are
hearing them again. It’s the same fight, all over again.
Regulations are a time-honored punching bag for business and for some on Capitol Hill.
The corruption of the campaign finance system, accelerated dramatically by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), has brought these destructive trends to the
fore, with both parties struggling to amass the billions they need to compete in the 2012 election
cycle. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the 2010 election results are indicative of a
tolerance for environmental damage and even catastrophe.
The latest free-for-all against regulation frames a fundamental question for Congress:
Will we do what we must to make sure that the environment we leave the next generation of
Americans is clean enough for them to live their lives free of the health risks from environmental
hazards? Or will we squeeze the last penny of monetary profit out of the planet’s resources, at
the cost of leaving behind a scarred landscape, polluted air and water, and enough toxics in the
food we eat to pose serious risks to our children and their children? This question is the same
that it has always been.
Thank you.
Attachment: Setting the Record Straight
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Setting the Record Straight:
The Crain and Crain Report on Regulatory Costs
Introduction
Critics of health, safety, and environment regulation have sought to buttress the case against
regulation by citing a 2010 report by economists Nicole Crain and Mark Crain called The Impact
of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms1 (“the Crain and Crain report”). The Crain and Crain report
is the fourth in a series of reports that have been produced under contract for the Small Business
Administration’s (SBA) Office of Advocacy since 1995, each of which has attempted to
calculate the total “burden” of federal regulations, and to demonstrate that small businesses in all
economic sectors bear a disproportionate share of that burden.2
Among the Crain and Crain report’s findings is one that has become a centerpiece of regulatory
opponents’ rhetoric: the “annual cost of federal regulations in the United States increased to
more than $1.75 trillion in 2008.”3 This figure is several orders of magnitude larger than the
estimate generated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)—the official estimate of
the aggregate costs and benefits of federal regulations prepared annually for Congress. The 2009
OMB report found that in 2008 annual regulatory costs ranged from $62 billion to $73 billion.4
The authors of the Crain and Crain report attribute this massive difference to the fact that their
report considers many more rules than do the annual OMB reports, including rules with
estimated costs less than $100 million, rules that were put on the books more than 10 years ago,
and rules issued by independent regulatory agencies.5
As this report demonstrates, however, much more is at work than that. In areas where the OMB
and Crain and Crain calculations overlap, Crain and Crain use the same cost data as OMB, but,
unlike OMB, which presents regulatory costs as a range, Crain and Crain always adopt the upper
end of the range for inclusion in their calculations, a departure that is not justified as we explain
in this report. Further, Crain and Crain’s calculations for the regulations not covered by OMB’s
report appear to be based largely on a decidedly unusual data source for economists—public
opinion polling, the results of which Crain and Crain massage into a massive, but unsupported
estimate of the costs of “economic” regulations. Because Crain and Crain have refused to make
their underlying data or calculations public—apparently even withholding them from the SBA
office that contracted for the study—it is difficult to know precisely how they arrived at the
result that economic regulation has a cost of $1.2 trillion dollars, comprising more than 70
percent of the total costs in their report. Nevertheless, even based on what Crain and Crain
reveal, their calculation of the cost of economic regulations is deeply flawed, as we also explain.
In addition, the OMB report accounts for an equally relevant figure that the Crain and Crain’s
$1.75 trillion figure simply omits: the economic benefits of regulation. OMB’s 2009 recent
report found that in 2008 annual benefits of regulation ranged from $153 billion to $806 billion.6
And, as a series of CPR reports have explained, the OMB reports likely overestimate regulatory
costs and underestimate regulatory benefits, including omitting from its calculations altogether
significant benefits that happen to defy monetization.7 In contrast, the Crain and Crain report
makes no effort to account for regulatory benefits. If, for example, a regulation imposes $100 in
1

costs on a business, but provides twice that in benefits, the Crain and Crain report would still
tally that as $100 cost to society, even though it provides substantial net benefits.
It’s easy to see why the anti-regulatory critics have seized on the Crain and Crain report and its
findings.8 The $1.75 trillion figure is a gaudy number that was sure to catch the ear of the media
and the general public. Upon examination, however, it turns out that the $1.75 trillion estimate is
the result of transparently unreliable methodology and is presented in a fashion calculated to
mislead.
This report points out the severe flaws with the effort by Crain and Crain to estimate total
regulatory costs. These flaws include:
•

Omitted benefits of regulation. A discussion of regulation is inherently incomplete—
and distorted—if it focuses on costs without also considering benefits. Simply put,
OMB’s calculations demonstrate that regulation has a positive net effect on the economy,
and not by a little. The Crain and Crain report simply ignores the benefits of regulation,
focusing solely on one half of the equation. But, claiming to present a compilation of
regulatory costs, without also presenting a compilation of regulatory benefits, is
fundamentally misleading. Indeed, using Crain and Crain’s methodology, practically any
economic transaction—from the purchase of a loaf of bread to the construction of a
manufacturing plant—would be counted as a drain on the economy, because they only
include the costs not the benefits.* The Crain and Crain report’s failure to include an
accounting of regulatory benefits is particularly puzzling, since virtually every source the
authors rely on for estimates of costs also provide estimates of benefits as well.

•

Questionable assumptions and flimsy data. The report’s estimate of “economic
regulatory” costs—financial regulations, for example—which account for 70 percent of
the total regulatory costs, is not based on actual cost estimates. Instead, this estimate is
based on the results of public opinion polling concerning the business climate of
countries that has been collected in a World Bank report. The authors of the World Bank
report warn that its results should not be used for exactly the type of extrapolations made
by Crain and Crain, because their underlying data are too crude. Crain and Crain
nevertheless enter the World Bank data into a formula, which they appear to have created
out of whole cloth, that purports to describe a relationship between a country’s regulatory
stringency and its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). OMB has repeatedly warned against

*

While comparing costs and benefits is beyond the scope of this paper, it is notable that the 2009 OMB report found
that total regulatory benefits are far larger than total regulatory costs. See infra endnote 4 and supra accompanying
text. This finding refers to total aggregate net benefits, which means that some individual regulations may not have
benefits that exceed costs. But, this result usually arises from the difficulty of monetizing regulatory benefits, rather
than the lack of actual benefits. See comments cited infra endnote 7; see also Rena Steinzor et al., A Return to
Common Sense: Protecting Health, Safety, and the Environment Through “Pragmatic Regulatory Impact Analysis”
(Ctr. for Progressive Reform, White Paper 909, 2009), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/PRIA_909.pdf; John Applegate et al., Reinvigorating Protection of
Health, Safety, and the Environment: The Choices Facing Cass Sunstein (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, White Paper
901, 2009), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/SunsteinOIRA901.pdf; Frank Ackerman et al.,
Applying Cost Benefit Analysis to Past Decisions: Was Protecting the Environment Ever a Good Idea? (Ctr. for
Progressive Reform, White Paper 401, 2004), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Wrong_401.pdf.

2

trying to reduce the complex relationship between these two concepts to such simplistic
terms, yet this is precisely what Crain and Crain do.
•

Opaque calculations. Contrary to academic and government norms, Crain and Crain do
not reveal their data or show the calculations they used to arrive at their cost estimates.
Neither is the information available from the SBA Office of Advocacy. Moreover, Crain
and Crain declined to furnish their data to CPR despite several requests. As a result, it is
impossible to replicate their results, a flaw so significant it would prevent the publication
of their paper in any respectable academic journal.

•

Slanted methodology. The Crain and Crain report suffers from several methodological
problems, all of which tilt the results towards an overstatement of regulatory costs. These
problems are itemized and explained further below.

•

Overstated costs. To estimate the cost of non-economic regulation, Crain and Crain
almost always used the agency estimates of such costs that were submitted to OMB.
Although OMB presents these costs as a range, Crain and Crain always used the upper
bound estimate, effectively eliminating the agencies’ careful efforts to draw attention to
the uncertainties in these calculations. Moreover, cost estimates are typically based on
industry data, and regulated entities have a strong incentive to overstate costs in this
circumstance. As discussed below, empirical studies have shown that such estimates are
usually too high.

•

Peer review rendered meaningless. The peer review process used by the SBA Office of
Advocacy does not support the reliability of the report. Only two people examined the
document. The authors ignored a significant criticism raised by one of the two reviewers
concerning their estimate of economic regulatory costs. As for the second person, the
entire review consisted of the following comments: “I looked it over and it's terrific,
nothing to add. Congrats[.]”9

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Crain and Crain report is sufficiently flawed
that it does not come close to justifying regulatory reform efforts, such as the REINS Act,† which
seek to limit protection of people and the environment. If Crain and Crain had used a more
straightforward and generally accepted methodology, they likely would have reached a figure
that was several orders of magnitude smaller. And, if Crain and Crain had properly considered
regulatory benefits, they likely would have found that regulation is a net economic plus for
society. Such findings, however, would not comport with the political agenda of the SBA’s
Office of Advocacy or of the opponents of regulation in general.

†

Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act, H.R. 10, 112th Cong. (2011). Under this bill,
no new “economically significant” regulations would take effect unless Congress affirmatively approved the
regulation within 90 days of receiving it, by means of a joint congressional resolution of approval, signed by the
President. For more information on the REINS Act, see Sidney Shapiro, The REINS Act: The Conservative Push to
Undercut Regulatory Protections for Health, Safety, and the Environment (Ctr. for Progressive Reform,
Backgrounder, 2011), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CPR_Reins_Act_Backgrounder_2011.pdf.
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The Crain and Crain Report’s Methodology
The Crain and Crain report purports to provide a complete accounting of all regulatory costs. It
divides the regulatory universe into four categories: economic regulations; environmental
regulations; tax compliance regulations; and occupational health and safety and homeland
security regulations. Notably, the report never provides a clear definition of the term
“regulation,” nor does it provide clear definitions of each of the four regulatory categories. Next,
the authors employ different methodologies to calculate the total costs of regulation in each
category. Finally, they add up the costs of regulation for each category to derive a total cost of
federal regulations.
The report provides only a part of the data, equations, assumptions, extrapolations, and
calculations that would be necessary for replicating the report’s results. The authors of this white
paper made several attempts to obtain the missing additional materials from the authors of the
Crain and Crain report, as well as from the SBA Office of Advocacy, which funded the report, so
that we could fully understand and verify the methodologies, data, and assumptions that were
employed. The authors of the Crain and Crain report provided us with only very general
responses and have given no indication that they would furnish us with the missing information.
Remarkably, a staff member at the SBA Office of Advocacy explained that his office did not
have access to any of the additional materials, since it had only contracted to receive the final
report from the authors.10 Thus, the SBA Office of Advocacy entered into an agreement with
Crain and Crain to spend taxpayer money on a report whose findings it could not then have
verified in any significant way—not even checking the arithmetic.‡
Because this underlying information is unavailable, the Crain and Crain report is a political
document, rather than an academic study. No academic author would submit such a study for
publication without revealing the data and calculations on which the scholar relied. No academic
publication would accept such a study unless such information was released. Academic reports
also acknowledge and discuss potential weaknesses in their calculations, a modesty that is absent
from the Crain and Crain report.

Methodological Problems
Economic Regulation Costs
To calculate the total cost of economic regulations, Crain and Crain employ a regression analysis
that purports to establish a correlation between a country’s score on the World Bank’s
“Regulatory Quality Index” (RQI) and the size of the country’s economic activity, as measured
by GDP per capita.11 According to the World Bank report, the RQI seeks to measure public
“perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and
regulations that permit and promote private sector development.”12 Crain and Crain have
‡

If the SBA Office of Advocacy contracts to have similar reports performed in the future, we strongly urge it to
obtain all the data, equations, assumptions, extrapolations, and calculations as part of the contract, and to make these
materials readily available in a useable format on its website.
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interpreted the RQI as measuring how friendly a country is to business interests.13 The World
Bank researchers did not intend for the RQI to be used as a proxy measure for regulatory burden
or as a tool for critiquing a particular country’s regulatory stringency.14 Nevertheless, Crain and
Crain use the RQI in precisely this fashion.
As the World Bank report explains, the RQI is based on public opinion polling, not quantitative
data. It is derived from a composite of 35 opinion surveys that asked questions about the
regulatory climate of approximately 200 countries.15 Given its subjective origins, the World
Bank researchers responsible for the RQI designed it with a few limited applications in mind—
namely, to make meaningful cross-country comparisons as well as to monitor a single country’s
progress over time. At the same time, these researchers strongly caution against using the RQI
for developing specific policy prescriptions in particular countries.16
Crain and Crain provide no justification defending their use of the RQI to estimate regulatory
costs, nor do they ever acknowledge the myriad theoretical or empirical problems with
calculating such costs based on public opinion polling. Significantly, one of the peer reviewers
of the Crain and Crain report raised this objection, stating “I am concerned that the index may
not measure what the authors say it measures, and even if it does, it may overstate the costs of
regulation when used in conjunction with the other measures.”17 The authors do not appear to
have revised the report in response to this comment.
As noted above, the Crain and Crain report uses the RQI, which the authors have converted into
a proxy measure for a country’s regulatory stringency, as the main variable in their formula for
calculating the cost of a country’s economic regulations—that is, the supposed reduction in that
country’s GDP caused by the regulations. The authors do not explain how they devised this
formula, nor do they provide any of the underlying data, calculations, and assumptions that they
used to devise it. Consequently, no one can verify whether or not the formula provides a
reasonable model of reality, nor can anyone verify their calculations.
Using this formula, Crain and Crain calculate the loss in GDP the United States suffers because
of economic regulation. It is unclear whether Crain and Crain calculate the loss in GDP as
compared to the country with the highest RQI score or whether they calculate the loss in GDP
attributed to all regulation. The latter baseline would reflect the GDP in a hypothetical United
States that had no economic regulations. Whichever baseline they use, Crain and Crain thus
conclude that the cost of economic regulations in the United States in 2008 was $1.236 trillion,
“as reflected in lost GDP.”18
Crain and Crain do not clearly define the category of “economic regulations,” other than to note
it is broadly inclusive.§ The lack of a clear definition opens up the possibility that the category
of “economic regulations” also includes the other categories of regulations identified by Crain
and Crain. If, for example, this category includes some environmental regulation costs, those
costs are also the subject of a separate calculation in the report. This would mean that some of
§

The report indicates that the category of economic regulations is broad enough to include “a wide range of
restrictions and incentives that affect the way businesses operate—what products and services they produce, how
and where they produce them, and how products and services are priced and marketed to consumers.” CRAIN &
CRAIN, infra endnote 1, at 17.
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these regulation costs would be counted twice (once as an economic regulation and once as an
environmental regulation), leading to an exaggeration of total regulation costs. Some of the
polling data used by the authors of the World Bank study in the calculation of the RQI asks
questions of environmental and safety regulations, although the majority of the questions are
about tax and price control regulations, trade barriers, access to capital, and regulatory barriers to
starting a new business.**
One other significant problem in this category of costs is that the regression analysis used in the
report assumes an overly simplistic relationship between regulatory stringency and GDP. As
noted above, the Crain and Crain report’s formula implies that increases in regulatory stringency
cause a reduction in a country’s economic activity, which are reflected in a decreased GDP. The
actual relationship between regulatory stringency and a country’s economic activity is not so
clear-cut, however, because measurements of GDP do not include regulatory benefits. On this
subject, the 2009 OMB report to Congress notes:
The relationship between regulation and indicators of economic activity raises a
number of complex questions, conceptual, empirical, and normative. A key issue
involves identification of the appropriate measures. For example, is GDP the
appropriate measure? As we have seen, many regulations have favorable net benefits,
and by hypothesis, such regulations are desirable on standard economic grounds. Of
course it would be useful to understand the effects on GDP of particular regulations
and of classes of regulations. But while important, GDP is hardly a complete measure
of relevant values, and some of the benefits of regulation, such as environmental
protection, are not adequately captured by changes in GDP.19
Finally, the report’s use of the RQI is misleading because it gives the false impression that the
U.S. regulatory burden is especially high. In fact, the United States has one of the highest RQI
scores, ranking eleventh out of more than 200 countries.20 The United States ranks higher than
many of its competitive trading partners, including China, Germany, Japan, Mexico, South
Korea, and Taiwan, and its RQI score has remained fairly constant since 1996, when these scores
were first developed.21 But Crain and Crain’s use of the RQI, and the SBA’s use of the Crain
and Crain report, imply that the U.S. is inferior to these other countries as an excellent place to
do business.

Environmental Regulation Costs
To calculate the costs of environmental regulations, the Crain and Crain report adds up the
estimated costs of environmental regulations found in each of OMB’s annual reports to Congress
on cost-benefit analysis since 2001.22 These estimates in turn are based on aggregation of the
**

The World Bank study relied on 35 different sources of global or regional surveys, produced by 33 different
organizations. Only 16 of the sources had any measure of regulation at all. Only one specifically mentioned
environmental regulations (the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey). Only 2 of the 35 sources
mentioned labor market policy: the African Development Bank (not relevant to the US) and the Institute for
Management Development World Competitiveness Yearbook. Neither of these two said which labor market issues
they measured, and there was no mention of safety and health by them. See Kaufmann et al., infra endnote 11, at 29
(Table 1), 39-71 (App. A).
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cost-benefit analyses that EPA produced when developing the regulations. Based on this data,
Crain and Crain find that the total cost of environmental regulations in 2008 was $281 billion,23
which is 16 percent of the total regulatory costs according to their estimate of total costs.
To generate cost estimates for its cost-benefit analyses, EPA primarily relies on surveys of
representative companies that the regulation will likely affect. Because companies know the
purpose of the surveys, they have a strong incentive to overstate costs in order to skew the final
cost-benefit analysis toward weaker regulatory standards.24 Agencies must also fill in any data
gaps they encounter by making various assumptions. Due to fear of litigation over the
regulation, they tend to adopt conservative assumptions about regulatory costs, such that the cost
assessment ends up reflecting the maximum possible cost, rather than the mean.25
Industry cost estimates—and therefore the cost estimates that EPA develops-- do not account for
technological innovations that reduce the cost of compliance and produce non-regulatory cobenefits, such as increased productivity. When companies are asked to predict which technology
they will employ to comply with a particular environmental regulation, they often will point to
the most expensive existing “off-the-shelf” technology available. Once the regulation actually
goes into effect, however, companies have a strong incentive to invent or purchase less costly
technologies to come into regulatory compliance. As a result, compliance costs tend to be less,
and often much less, than the predicted costs. Moreover, the technological innovations tend to
produce co-benefits unrelated to the regulation—such as increased productivity and efficiency—
that the company strives to achieve in any event. Given these co-benefits, only a portion of the
innovative technology’s costs can fairly be counted as compliance costs.26
As the following chart indicates, retrospective studies of regulatory costs find that the initial cost
estimates are often too high.
Retrospective Studies of Regulatory Costs
Study

Subject of Cost Estimates
27

Results

PHB, 1980

Sector level capital
expenditures for pollution
controls

− EPA overestimated capital costs more than
it underestimated them, with forecasts
ranging 26 to 126% above reported
expenditures

OTA, 199528

Total, annual, or capital
expenditures for occupational
safety & health regulations

Goodstein &
Hedges,
199729

Various measures of cost for
pollution prevention

Resources for
the Future,
199930

Various measures of cost for
environmental regulations

− OSHA overestimated costs for 4 of 5
health regulations, with forecasts ranging
from $5.4 million to $722 million above
reported expenditures
− Agency and industry overestimated costs
for 24 of 24 OSHA & EPA regulations, by
at least 30% and generally by more than
100%
− Agency overestimated costs for 12 of 25
rules, and underestimated costs for 2 rules
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Finally, unlike the OMB reports, which present regulatory costs as a range, Crain and Crain
always adopt the upper end of the range for inclusion in their calculations.31 The authors justify
this move by claiming that agencies allegedly have a strong incentive to underestimate
regulatory costs, although they provide no empirical evidence to support this claim. In fact, as
just explained, it is likely that regulatory costs are overstated. In any case, the choice by Crain
and Crain to always take the higher bound estimate, rather than presenting their results as a range
of costs, as OMB does, is a misleading use of the OMB data.
Agencies were not required by Executive Order to provide OMB with estimates of regulatory
costs and benefits prior to 1988. For this reason, OMB had to rely on non-government estimates
in order to estimate regulatory benefits and costs prior to 2000. For environmental regulations
issued before 1988, the 2001 OMB report relied on a 1991 study of regulatory costs undertaken
by economists Robert Hahn and John Hird.32
Hahn and Hird performed no new calculations of regulatory costs, but instead they generated an
estimate by synthesizing a set of earlier studies of regulatory costs conducted by a small circle of
conservative economists.33 These estimates are subject to the same limitations as agencyproduced cost analyses, including relying on industry-estimates of compliance costs and failing
to account for innovation.†† An additional problem is that the Hahn and Hird study is nearly 20
years old, and many of the earlier studies and data it relies upon are more than 30 years old. The
data and assumptions reflected in the Hahn and Hird study cannot be reasonably extrapolated to
modern social and economic reality.‡‡

Occupational Safety and Health and Homeland Security Regulation Costs
The Crain and Crain report concludes that the total cost of occupational safety and health and
homeland security regulations in 2008 was $75 billion,34 which is four percent of their total
costs. Occupational safety and health regulations accounted for $65 billion of the total.
Occupational Safety and Health Regulation Costs
To calculate the occupational safety and health regulations, the Crain and Crain report relies on
two sources. The first source, a 2005 study by Joseph Johnson, provides the total costs of all
occupational safety and health regulations issued before 2001.35 The second source, the 2009
††

In addition, many of these earlier studies assume a regulatory baseline of zero for their comparisons of regulatory
costs. In other words, these studies assume that in the absence of the regulations under examination, companies
would have taken no environmentally protective actions. This assumption has no basis in a reality where other
existing regulations (federal, state, and local), fear of tort liability, and simple market forces induce companies to
take some minimal level of environmentally protective action all the time. This minimal level of actions represents
the proper baseline against which regulatory costs should be measured. To the extent that these earlier studies
assume a zero baseline, they grossly overestimate regulatory costs. McGarity & Ruttenberg, infra endnote 24, at
2047.
‡‡
In the intervening years, the U.S. economy and society have drastically changed. For example, scientific
knowledge regarding the harmful public health and environmental effects of pollution has greatly improved, the
U.S. has shifted from an industrial sector-based economy to a service sector-based one, and even industry has
become characterized by more automation and less human labor. See Ian D. Wyatt & Daniel E. Hecker,
Occupational Changes During the 20th Century, MONTHLY LABOR REV., March 2006.
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OMB report to Congress, provides the total cost of all occupational safety and health regulation
issued since 2001.
The cost estimate from the 2009 OMB report to Congress is based on a simple aggregation of the
cost-benefit analyses that OSHA produced when developing these regulations.36 As discussed
above, the cost assessments generated as part of these cost-benefit analyses greatly overstate the
costs of regulations, since the agencies that produce them rely on industry for estimates of
compliance costs, adopt conservative assumptions to fill in data gaps, and fail to account for
innovation.
The Johnson study likewise suffers from several flaws, leading it to overestimate these
regulatory costs. The study begins by aggregating the agency-produced cost-benefit analyses for
all of OSHA rules issued before 2001.37 As just noted, these costs estimates are overstated.
Nevertheless, the Johnson study then inflates OSHA’s cost estimates by multiplying the total of
all of the estimates by 5.5. According to Johnson, using the multiplier is necessary to account for
the costs of all of OSHA’s non-major regulations—since OSHA does not perform cost-benefit
analyses for these regulations—and for fines levied for violations of any OSHA standards.38 In
other words, the Johnson study assumes that for every dollar industry spends on compliance with
OSHA’s major rules, it spends $5.50 on compliance with non-major regulations and on fines for
violations of existing OSHA standards.
We see no justification for counting the fines that companies pay for violating regulatory
standards as regulatory costs. Instead, these are the costs of choosing to break the law. That is,
the fines would never have occurred if the firms had not chosen to disobey the law. Under this
logic, mass lawbreaking raises regulatory costs, enabling regulatory opponents to argue that we
need to reduce regulation because of these high regulatory costs.
The Johnson study took the multiplier of 5.5 from a 1996 study by Harvey James.39 The James
study uses an unpublished and otherwise unavailable 1974 estimate prepared by the National
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) of the per-firm cost of compliance with OSHA
regulations.40 Because the report is unavailable, it cannot be checked for accuracy. As we
related earlier, industry estimates of regulatory costs are suspect because of the political
incentive to inflate such costs. Nevertheless, the Crain and Crain report incorporate the Johnson
study without any discussion of this significant limitation in the data.
Homeland Security Regulation Costs
To calculate the cost of all homeland security regulations, the Crain and Crain report again relies
on the 2009 OMB report to Congress,41 which is based on the cost-benefit analyses that the
Department of Homeland Security produced when developing its regulations.42 The cost
assessments provided in these cost-benefit analyses are overstated for all the reasons stated
above: industry-supplied estimates of compliance estimates; conservative assumptions to fill in
data gaps; and failure to account for innovation.
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Tax Compliance Regulation Costs
To calculate the cost of tax compliance regulations, the Crain and Crain report starts with
estimates of the time that businesses, non-profit organizations, and individuals spend each year
completing tax-related forms and filings, and multiplies it by an estimate of the hourly cost of
filling out the forms. Using this methodology, the Crain and Crain report concludes that the total
cost of tax compliance regulations in 2008 was $160 billion,43 which is about nine percent of
their total costs.
The report says it derives its estimates of the time it takes to fill out tax forms from the Internal
Revenue Service and the Tax Foundation, a conservative-leaning non-profit organization.44
However, they do not explain which data they use or how those data contribute to their estimate.
To the extent that data from the Tax Foundation are used, the report’s estimate of the amount
time spent on tax compliance should be viewed with caution since the Tax Foundation tends to
be “anti-tax” in orientation.
The authors calculate tax compliance costs for businesses separately from individuals and nonprofit organizations, using the reasonable assumption that businesses spend more money per
hour complying with tax regulations. Crain and Crain assume that all businesses rely on
“Human Resources professionals” to prepare their taxes, but they provide no evidence to justify
this assumption. They nevertheless multiply estimates of the amount of time it takes to fill out
the tax forms by $49.77 per hour (“the hourly compensation rate for Human Resources
professionals”) on tax compliance.45 The report then appears to assume that all individuals and
non-profit organizations have their taxes prepared by accountants or auditors, and it estimates
that these entities spend $31.53 per hour (“the average hourly wage rate for accountant and
auditors”) on tax compliance.46 With respect to individuals, this assumption seems particularly
unfounded given that millions of American households prepare their own taxes.

Conclusion
The Crain and Crain study is rife with flawed methodologies and questionable data and
assumptions. Of even greater importance, each of the problems with the Crain and Crain
report’s methodologies, data, and assumptions lead to an overstatement of regulatory costs.
Because of these problems with the Crain and Crain report’s reliability, we believe policymakers
should disregard its misleading conclusions as they consider matters of regulatory policy.
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